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Article 1

ESSAY

Reflections on the Philosophy of Law
Part One: Levels of Legal Being-A Note

on the Ontology of Law
Igor N. Grazin*
I.

The Various Kinds of Law

Numerous discussions, definitions and continuing re-definitions of
the notion of law have proven at least one solid fact: Law seems to be a
very complicated phenomenon that can be dealt with from various points
of view. One can, moreover, refer to the ambiguity of the word "law" in
ordinary language and to the complications that are connected with the
translation of it from one language to another. When faced with this
situation it is not desirable to enlarge the number of definitions of law or
to formulate a new conceptual set for its description. Rather, the aim of
this Essay is simply to show some common points in different views on
law and so to point out at least some of the aspects of legal phenomena
that make it possible to speak about the progress of legal cognition itself
in general, and that form the grounds for the discussion between legal
theoreticians with different gnoseological (epistemological), methodological and philosophical backgrounds. As will be seen later, this approach is somewhat formalistic and cannot pretend to be a complete
explanation of the being of law as a socio-political phenomenon. While,
admittedly, the law is a political phenomenon-one connected with class
struggle and the activity of different political groups-this Essay will concentrate on its gnoseological aspect.
II.

Law as "Ordinary Jurisprudence"

It is common to our everyday understanding that an area usually
named "law" encompasses a set of social phenomena of different kinds.
It includes statutes and legal codes, state institutions and officials, various kinds of legal activities and legal positions, and norms and guidelines
of behavior. Any fragment of this set has been subject to a highly specialized theoretical and empirical investigation by legal science. Rather than
* Chair Professor of General Theory and History of Law (University of Tartu); Member of the
Soviet of the Union (U.S.S.R.); Chief of the Department of Law and the Institute of Philosophy,
Sociology and Law of the Sciences of Estonia.
These papers are a theoretical by-product of research work carried out due to a grant from the
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express the specific features of all these phenomena, this Essay looks at
them as some whole, syncretic phenomenon.
It is sufficient to say that at this everyday level law appears as a set of
norms or rules. It is in Hegel's words, some measure of the frame of
social behavior. So law is a set of restrictions whose protection is guaranteed by some authoritative (legal) institutions.
Now a few words about the ontology of these restrictions. It is
known from Hegel's philosophy that a measure is a borderline between
two qualities. When this borderline is crossed, one quality ceases to exist
and transforms into another. This process is by nature objective and
goes on without any "authority." Here there is a causal relation-when
the measure is overcome, a new quality appears. Likewise, the capitalist
economic system is independent of the length of the working day: The
working day may be 12 hours or 6 hours; but it is no longer capitalism if
the surplus value of the laborer's work is not expropriated by the
capitalist.
This example demonstrates that law is not purely objective in the
sense of an ordinary measure. Law is, in terms of this example, the rule
that lays down the length of the working day. It is the law that puts the
borders to 12 or 6 hours, but does not change the deeper qualitative
nature of the capitalistic system. So we can say that law is a certain secondary measure, an additional regulation that is based on some recognized
interests (aims of some social groups) and is realized in the frame of possibilities of a given social reality. This conclusion follows from reflection
upon the objective dialectics of social development. Law is man made;
that is, it is mediated by human creative activity. It unites, into a causal
chain, phenomena that were not thus united before.
So, in spite of its objective and material foundations, the essence of
law is also based on some human understanding of the nature of society
and of man's abilities to manipulate society to a certain degree. These
ideas, carried by different groups, may compete with each other and give
some result that could not be predicted by them. It is, nevertheless, a
result of objective social relations. But actually the first level consciousness and relations are to a certain extent influenced by it. This constitutes the first level of legal being or so-called "Ordinary Jurisprudence."
III.

The Ordinary Level of Law

This Ordinary Jurisprudence is then embedded in everyday consciousness and some set of actual interpersonal relations. The Ordinary
Jurisprudence participates in the human ideality. It results in norms.
These norms are in a certain sense a final point of a certain cognitive
activity. This does not mean that all ordinary-level normative systems
are explicitly understood and expressed as legal systems. Sometimes, especially in dealing with earlier periods of society, it can be stated only
retrospectively; today one may speak of this or that law, but it is possible
that in an earlier society norms were understood as myths, religions, etc.
They may not even be understood as norms created by men, but as products of some higher order of causality carried out via men, as in the case

1989]

REFLECTIONS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

of taboos. Cult activities are not, among these societies, separated from
the world as something man made, but are put on the level of the objective causal chain.
Nevertheless, there is a language that corresponds to this level of
legal or quasi-legal activities. This language describes the everyday experience and is a link between the social phenomena that are its object.
This language may contain descriptions of obligations expressed in
myths, everyday understandings, etc. For an older example of this level,
one can refer to Scandinavian sagas as a form of such descriptive Ordinary jurisprudence or to the casuistry of medieval criminal codes, such as
the C.C.C. and the Lex Salica.1 Let us designate the language expressing
this level of legal activity as Lo (L-ordinary).
IV. The Normative Level of Law
The second level of law is a generalization of the former one. It is,
the-efore, sometimes difficult to make explicit distinction between them.
Nevertheless, such a distinction is clear at least intuitively. This is a level
where legal norms appear as a set of norms in the strict sense of the
word. These norms are general rules that are to be continuously applied
to some classes of social behavior and subjects of law. It is a result of a
transformation from casuistic legal systems to codes that unify different
fragments of being that are legally relevant. This is the point where precedent also ceases to be only a model of a decision of a relatively identical case but becomes a general form of solving legal problems. The most
distinctive form of this level is expressed in the systems of codified law
with relatively general and systematic rules. Due to their character,
codes are much smaller than the collections of casuistic regulations. For
example, the Criminal Code of Estonian S.S.R. consists of only 244
paragraphs. Let us designate the language expressing this level of legal
2
activity as Ln (L-norm).
V.

The Theoretical Level of Law

The next level can be more clearly separated from previous ones. It
is the level of legal science, theory, and dogmatics. The transformation
from the former levels means here a shift in the subjects reflected by the
knowledge on these levels. Where the Lo and Ln were reflections upon
the social realities themselves, this level of legal theory mirrors these realities plus the existing legal norms as an additionalfragment to this reality
(which norms are themselves the results of some cognition).
Aleksander Peczenik was among the first to express clearly the fact
that there are two elements in legal theory: the "scientific description
and [the] unscientific evaluation. ' 3 To a large extent the question about
I The C.C.C. is also known as the Criminal Code of Carl the Great; the Lex Salica, or Salic Law,
"was the code of the Salian Franks who conquered Gaul in the 5th century and the most important
... of all Teutonic laws." Salic Law, 10 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 352 (1987).
2 See Attanasio, Everyman s ConstitutionalLaw: A Theory of the PowerofJudicial Review, 72 GEO. LJ.
1665 (1984).
3 A. PECZENIK, THE BASIS OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 133 (1983).
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the connection of Is and Ought remains problematic. But, as the author
has stated earlier,4 and as Peczenik 5 has recognized, a legal norm, at least
in societies with advanced legal systems, can be understood as a conclusive part of legal theory. One may further state that the legal norm has
always been a practically conclusive part of something-whether it be a
religion, an ancient polytheistic world-view, a mythological interpretation of the world, etc. While this discussion does not attempt to solve the
problem of Is and Ought, it nevertheless follows that there is some level
of legal theory (for instance, a myth or a religion) where Is and Ought are
connected in such a manner that Ought can be derived from Is. Let us
designate the language corresponding to this level of legal activity as Lt
(L-theory).
VI.

The Meta-theoretical Level of Law

The preceding four decades have shown us in a very convincing
manner the existence of a fourth level. This is a level of meta-scientific
(gnoseological) reflection upon law and legal theory. This makes for another shift of subject. The matter that is reflected upon is a set of legal
theories in their opposition to the law and world. Whereas legal theory
accepts only implicitly the fact that its subject (law) is a result of cognition and the theory aims at changing or evaluating it, the meta-scientific
approach (elsewhere we have called it the philosophy of law) deals with
theories of law as products of the cognitive activity of man. Thus, the
content of considerations on this level is a philosophical and methodological one, as represented by Peczenik's work that was noted above.
The language of this level of legal activity may be referred to as Lint (Lmeta-theory).
VII.

The Relationship Between the Levels of Law

Therefore, the different levels of legal being, and the languages that
correspond to them, form some sort of hierarchy or a vertical structure.
Every next step on this ladder is as the meta-level of the former. It is
unnecessary to discuss the problems of the relationship between an
object-language and the corresponding meta-language since these
problems are well-known from modern philosophical and logical literature. 6 But three points concerning this relationship are of special value.
First, every meta-language contains the object-language. Otherwise,
it would be impossible to speak about a meta-language as a reflection
upon the object-language.
Second, meta-language contains a shortened version of the object-language. Otherwise we would not have a meta-language at all but a wider
variant of the same object-language. This means that the meta-language
4

I. GRAZIN, TEKST PRAVA (1983).
PECZENIK, supra note 3, at 122.
To mention only some classics: I A. N. WHITEHEAD & B. RUSSELL, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA
161 (1950); A. Tarski, The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages in LOGIC, SEMANTICS,
METAMATHEMATICS: PAPERS FROM 1923 TO 1938 (1956); D. Davidson, Radical Interpretation, 27 DiALECTICA 313 (1973).
5
6
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does not include all the content of all words in the object-language;
rather, it deals only with some classes, types, or forms of them. A grammar operates with nouns, verbs, adverbs, etc., not with concrete ones,
but as representatives of some linguistic structure and as some groups of
words. This is analogous to juristic activity which involves the relation
between legal norms and the principles of their interpretation. One does
not have specific rules for the interpretation of every separate norm, but
only for some classes and types of them.
Third, the classification of object-linguistic phenomena presupposes
a new cognitive position which enables one to view the foundation of
these classifications. Thus, the meta-language is in some sense wider than
the object-language because it must contain something else than the objectlanguage.
Schematically the relations between the levels of "legal being" may
be presented in the following manner:
MML.

FL

the

world

Every meta-level (Ln to Lo, Lt to Ln, and Lmt to Lt) in the hierarchy
of "legal being" deals with some groups or classes of legal phenomena,
abstracts itself from their actual content and deals with some forms of
legal being. This is apparent from the intuitive point of view. For
instance, norms do not include the whole content of a concrete case but
only some of those features that constitute its legal form.
Now we can define the core of legal being approximately as Lakatos
has envisioned it. There is a legal reality on each of the four levels. The
common feature among them is the existence of some legal formula that
appears as a system of legal rights and duties. The nature of this formula
is of course different at the different levels. At level Ln, it directly
expresses a system of rights/duties; at the Lt level, it is the theoretical
explanation and investigation of this formula; and, at the level Lmt, the
investigation of the cognitive status of this formula and of its theoretical
reflection is at stake. It does not mean that every fragment of legal
theory (every book or every article) deals with this formula or that this is
the whole content of actual legal science. It is, however, clear that
without this orientation there would be no legal theory at all.
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Legal Progress

Three thousand years of modern civilization have essentially
changed the world and society. Social revolutions and radical reforms
have changed society to such an extent at times that it becomes extremely difficult to compare different time periods or to trace the line of
progress of certain social institutions. The progress is most evident in
the example of the development of the means of production, but even
this example does not give us the entire answer about the progress of
some social institutions, especially those that are less connected with the
material basis of society. When one compares ancient slavery with the
modem liberal and socialist concept of the right social order, one may
conclude that there has been progress towards the liberty of man (at least
the legal equality of all men) and the recognition of man as the final end
of society (which is, in a word, Kant's ideal). While generally this may be
so, there are important counter-examples. The revival of slavery in 18th
century America and the Nazi-regimes of 20th century Europe detract
from any such progress.
Therefore, it is possible to speak of progress as to the actual content
of legal phenomena if we surpass the sphere of legal science and enter
the wider context of social philosophy. But, in spite of that, we can trace
the progress of law as aform of regulation of human behavior-meaning
a content-based logical formula that develops relatively independently of
its actual content. Thus, the emptio-venditio of Roman law does not differ
so very much from our modem concept of sale. What has radically
changed is our substantive idea about what may be bought and sold.
Men and women, for instance, cannot be. This can also be shown by the
fact that most technical (formal) rules of legal interpretation of law have
not essentially changed since ancient Rome. They are still similar in the
legal profession throughout the modern world. The relative stability of
legal formulas does not mean that they should be considered external.
Some legal concepts, such as the Roman nexum which was a loan guaranteed by the freedom of the debtor, have disappeared; while others, such
as the form contracts for carriage of goods by ship used in England, have
appeared.
So, in one sense, legal progress is the development of a legal
formula. Indeed, this kind of legal progress is a point of common interest for all jurists.
IX.

Conclusion

The existence of a certain form that has developed throughout social
history is apparent on the level of legal theory. Legal theories have been
faced with the inertia of laws and the dynamism of actual everyday life.
The stressing of one of these components in this dialectical contradiction
has been since antiquity a dilemma of both legal positivism and natural
law. It should be noted here, for instance, that the natural law conception was accepted by both parties in the English revolution. Thus, these
conceptions contain political elements. They are different due to actual
political conditions. But, the natural law thinking itself constitutes a kind
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of logic or form of legal thought. When speaking about natural law we
are not envisaging it as a particular school, but rather as a substantive
form of legal thought.
This contradiction between natural law and legal positivism can only
be solved at a level of generalization higher than that of legal theory itself. Any solution, therefore, necessarily appeals to the level of philosophical methodology or social philosophy.

Part Two: Competing Legal Theories-The Problem for
the Philosophy of Law
There is a possibility, and even a necessity, of forming a philosophy
of law that is principally different from the general theory of law. Competition among legal theories is an example of the set of problems of this
philosophy of law.
I. The Recognition of a Meta-Level of Law
Modern legal literature uses the two concepts of a "general theory of
law" and a "philosophy of law" as parallel ones despite the fact that it is
possible and useful to make a clear distinction between them. While
Lord Lloyd of Hampstead says that the "choice between a philosophy or
7
a science of law is no doubt to a large extent a matter of terminology,"
this is not simply a terminological problem.
Today there is generally no clear conception about what a legal theory is or when our considerations about law reach a theoretical level.
But, for the purpose of this discussion, it is sufficient to accept some intellectual constructions as the theoretical ones by convention. It is indubitable, for instance, thatJurisprudence8 by John Austin and An Introduction
to the Philosophy of Law 9 by Roscoe Pound contain what can be called theories. But the fact is that there is not any competition between them in the
strict sense of the word because they deal with different subjects-the
first with legal texts, and the second with actual activities of legal officials.
Hence, these theories can be understood as complementary ones that are
united only on some common foundation of positivistic methodology. In
short, these theories are not competing but only different.
R. Dworkin has given us a catalogue of problems that legal theory
must deal with to be complete. 10 In fact, every legal theory or school of
legal thought usually discusses only some of the problems. So, in order
to determine the role, place and value of the various legal theories, one
must have some cognitive position that is more general than that of these
theories.
Today this seems to be trivial but it was not so before the formulation of Russell's paradox and its solution. Russell's theory of logical
classes and types proves that theory and meta-theory (that which contains theory in its subject) represent two different levels of knowledge.
In addition, this can be supported by Tarski's semantic conception of
truth. Applying this conception to legal thought, it follows that considerations about what law is about and what legal theories are, are two different things. The latter considerations are the meta-level for the former
considerations. In addition to this purely logical argument, there are
7

D. LLOYD (Lord Lloyd of Hampstead), INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 16 (5th ed. 1985).

8 J. AUSTIN,
9

10

LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW

R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (2nd ed. 1954).
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY VII-IX (1978).

(4th ed. 1986).
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more substantial ones. The latter type of argument derives from the difference between the objects it is possible to reflect upon-the law and
the theories about law.
II.

Philosophy of Law

It has been stated by Engels in his Ludwig Feuerbachand The Outcome of
ClassicalGerman Philosophy 11 that the fundamental question of philosophy
can be reduced to the relationship between matter (being), and consciousness, materiality and ideality. This was first clearly expressed in
Descartes' philosophical system. Taking this fundamental question into
consideration, it becomes evident that the general theory of the law (including Hegel's "Philosophy of Law") ceases to be the philosophy of law
because it deals with law itself independently of its relations to legal cognition. That is why the general theory of law is an ontological description and explanation of law that abstracts itself from the other member in
the fundamental question of philosophy (man with his conciousness).
The problems of legal theories present a somewhat different situation. Here the opposition of some legal reality and its reflection is the
relationship between law (as some legal matter) and the results of its cognition (as some juridical consciousness). If these statements are accepted
as true, the conclusion follows that in dealing with the problems of legal
theories themselves one must consult the fundamental question of philosophy in general. This is the first and main reason why I prefer to use
the term "philosophy of law."
Another aspect of the fundamental question of philosophy is the relation of consciousness to matter. To put it in another way, this is the
problem of the cognitivity of the world. Generally, it is the question of
metaphysical and dialectical method in philosophy, and, on a more concrete level, the problem of valid intellectual means to achieve the truth.
It may be stated further that these problems, as meta-theoretical for legal
science, are philosophical by their nature.
There is less important, but nevertheless considerable, ground for
using the phrase "philosophy of law" here. It is a fact that several other
sciences today have developed to the level of self-cognition. The
branches engaged in investigation of epistemological problems of these
sciences are often named the philosophies of these sciences. As illustrations, the meta-methematical trend founded by Cantor, Hilbert, Godel,
Kleene and others is the philosophy of mathematics, and the meta-historical theory of historical knowledge created by Collingwood is the philosophy of history. Naturally, the analogical branch in legal science may be
designated the philosophy of law.
The main difference between the philosophy of law and the general
theory of law is that between gnoseology and ontology. It becomes apparent in the difference of questions for which they are seeking answers.
The general theory of law is engaged in questions like: "What is law?"
(or more specifically, "Which are the laws in concrete?"); "What are the
11 F. ENGELS,
ed. 1941).

LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE OUTCOME OF CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

(2nd
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conditions for legal validity?"; "What is a legal norm?"; and, "What is
the structure of the norm?" The philosophy of law asks questions of another kind: "What is a legal theory?"; "What is explanation in legal science?"; and "What is the difference between legal theories and, for
example, Balzac's or Kafka's discussions about law?"
In the practice of legal/scientific activities the philosophy of law and
the general theory of law are closely connected and interwoven, such that
it is not easy to discover a line of demarcation in every case. But, there
are some real problems of legal science, such as the problems of the role
of legal cognition in human cognition in general, and the place of law in
human culture, that demand this division. The implanting of law in
wider cultural and philosophical contexts opens the possibility of determining the role of different legal theories in the general process of legal
cognition and the competition between them.
III.

Law in Culture

Here, we broach the problem of the comparability of different legal
theories. In spite of a large number of definitions of "culture," it is possible to fix one common feature of phenomena usually included in this
notion; that is, against the background of non-culture, culture represents
itself as a semiotic phenomenon, a collection of material facts that have
certain sense and meaning. Thus, in a wider sense of the word, "culture"
is a set of some sort of texts.' 2 Culture, as this sort of "the second nature," is a product of human activity and reflects the human experience
in a shortened way. Viewed separately each fragment of culture is the
result and not the actual process of its achieving. The progress of mankind is explained by the realization that every new generation does not
start from "point-zero" but acquires the experience of past generations
mediately through culture.
Because of culture every man is integrated in society as a whole.
The law fulfills the same function. It unites a man with his society, determines his actual behavior, and integrates him into some socio-political
organization of mankind. Because of this similarity the law appears to be
a fragment of culture in general. This implies that every law, whether
written or unwritten, can be treated as a textual formation. In the case of
unwritten law, the signs of its texts are symbols and rituals as in the case
of totems and taboos. But, in any case, law and its textual form have
meaning for man and society.
But, there is another aspect of the problem of the textuality of law.
The fact is that every text is from the cybernetic point of view a negentropic' 3 phenomenon as well. This means that it functions in a system as
information and causes negentropic consequences, including the increased organization of the system. 14 As opposed to the semiotic aspect,
this is an objective process. In other words, the real functioning of a
12
13

This idea has been carried out by "Tartu-school" in semiotics lead by Professor Yuri Lotman.
"Negentropy" is defined as "[niegative entropy, as a measure of order or information." 2 A
SUPPLEMENT TO THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1157 (1976) (emphasis added).
14

This aspect is presented in the conception of "social memory" by Professor Jaan Rebane.
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legal text, its actual role in society and its meaningful content are not
equivalent. This proposition is illustrated by the gap between what is
said by a legislator and what the law in fact does ("law in books" versus
"law in action").
So we have two focuses at hand: (a) the text of law that is common
to all of us and functions objectively; and, (b) the semantic content of the
text (or, what the text in fact says). The semantic content is discovered
by a procedure that may be called interpretation. Legal theory is one
form of doing that.
Therefore, our main conclusion runs as follows: If there is a common foundation for legal/theoretical constructions (that is legal text),
then the difference and competition between these circumstances becomes apparent in interpretation as a process and result of them.
Whereas the first moment, the text, makes legal theories comparable, the
second, their interpretation, discovers their difference.
IV.

The Levels of Competition Between Legal Theories

Starting from the legal text as matter, opposed to the cognitive activity of man, the stages of legal cognition may be described as follows:
A.

The Discovery of a Norm

Legal cognition includes the discovery of a norm from the text-the
legal interpretation in the widest sense of the word. In other words, it
means the inclusion of the text in some wider contexts, such as reason,
God, or nature for natural law conceptions, or the will of legislator or
actual activity of the officials for positivism.
B.

The Formation of an Ontological Conception

A second level of legal cognition is the formation of an ontological
conception of law. Our interpretation of legal text is implicitly based on
some conception of what law is. Thus, if we try to find from the legal text
some will of a legislator, we have accepted, implicitly at least, that the law
is a legislator's will. Such an assumption demands a theory about this
will, its ontology.
C.

The Formation of Methodological Programmes

A third level of legal cognition is the formation of methodological
programmes for the studying of law in general. After we have some conception about what the law is, we can carry out the intellectual methods
for its learning. To repeat an example, if the law is the will of a legislator, then we must use adequate methods to study it. These methods may
include, among others, sociological and historical ones.
D. Relations Between Levels of Legal Cognition
On these three levels, legal theories are comparable and compete in
ways that are not usually expressed in the legal theories themselves. Preliminarily, it is necessary to clarify our understanding of competition be-
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tween theories. In a classical dialectical-materialistic sense, this is an
active negation of opponents that is stronger than simple difference and
that reflects the essential dialectical antagonism. The factual argumentation of the following statements would require extensive discussion, so
the following inquiry restricts itself to the hypothetical status of them.
1. Level I
Any given legal text may be included within two contexts-other text
or some non-textual phenomena (although, strictly speaking, phenomena that are not texts in a given situation may be texts in other situations). This is embodied in the fact that all theories of interpretation may
be reduced to the following ones:
(a) the logical transformation of the primary text;
(b) the grammatical transformation of the primary text;
(c) the discovery of the historical background of the given text; and,
(d) the discovery of legal principles embodied in the text.
Apparently, for the logical (a) and grammatical (b) theories the context is textual, and for the historical (c) and legal (d) theories it is nontextual. The opposition here lies in the fact that texts and reality are
objective opponents as matter and its reflection.
2.

Level II
At a second level, one feels the difference between the two conceptions: The law is seen, whether as a set of some separated facts (texts,
social actions) or as some new phenomenon, with its qualitatively specific
character that cannot be reduced to any set of rights and duties. It is a
difference between reflections upon individual legal systems or laws, and
upon the law. Sometimes these oppositions may be united in one theory,
as for instance, in the axiomatics of Robert Nozick's theory. But the fundamental difference between them cannot be overcome even in such a
case. On this level, the competition of theories is analogical to the opposition of nominalism and realism in the classical philosophical discussion
on universals.
3.

Level III
At the third level, the situation is the most complicated. First, the
nominalist and realist ontologies (do not confuse "realism" in this sense
with realism as a school of American legal theory) determines different
forms of the cognition of law. The nominalist ontology utilizes the form
of induction and re-induction, while the realist ontology utilizes the logic
of deduction. Naturally these are competing forms of cognition. But the
actual history of legal thought has shown us another opposition as wellthat of the rational and a-rational (personal and hermeneutical) methodologies of law. Since Wilhelm Dilthey there has been the tendency to
replace the explanation and description of law with its understanding
(the procedure of verstehen).
As was indicated above, these oppositions are not often expressed in
actual legal theories in an explicit manner. Nevertheless, they are pres-
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ent in them as some aspects, moments, and tendencies. Since it is inappropriate to make critical remarks on these positions here, the discussion
will try only to call attention to the objective foundation of the existence
of these competing oppositions. Philosophy has elucidated the fact, that
appeared as a paradox at. least as far back in antiquity as Zeno, that all
movement may be considered as a dialectical unity of continual transformations and some discrete moments in this process. In the legal field
this same opposition appears in that there is a permanent contradiction
between fixed legal texts of which legislation is only one form, and the
actual dynamism of socio-cultural realities. It is easy to see that all oppositions fixed above are the variables of this fundamental contradiction.
V. Does the Philosophy of Law Give Us Anything New?
Even the reader who accepts every sentence written above, not to
mention the one who does not, may reasonably ask, "What are all these
abstract deliberations for?" Or, more simply, "Is the game worth the
candle?"
It is a common statement today that the main opponents in modem
Western legal theory are legal positivism, with its analytical and sociological variants, and the various theories of natural law. Generally speaking,
positivism deals with law as with something that is equivalent to legislation (or actual juridical activities of authorities), while the natural law
conception is based on the difference between them. So it seems that
these two trends in legal theory are engaged in research activities in different areas: Legal positivists are reflecting upon legislation and its empirical functioning, and the adherents of the natural law conception are
writing about something that is not always fixed in legislation and is different from authority-sanctioned law.
The discussion given above' seems to prove that the opposition between legal positivism and natural law is unsatisfactory and needs some
concretization that can be carried out from the position of the philosophy
of law as legal epistemology. It is abundantly clear that all members of
the debate reflect the legal matters one-sidely, incompletely, and metaphysically, but the fact is also that they reflect some real moments of real
dialectics of legal cognition. The investigation of these oppositions from
the position of philosophy of law can give us something that may be
called the theory of legal theories. In speaking of the theory of legal
theories, we are speaking about explicit self-consciousness of legal science
that can exclude some quasi-theoretical debates as non-scientific ones.
This is a fairly practical result.
The situation found in legal science is paradoxical indeed: On the
other levels of cognition we accept the unity of logical and historical
methods in research activities, but we do not fix it on the level of metalegal science. We have the history of legal and political ideas but none of
their theory. The development of the philosophy of law must fill in this
blank.

